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Abstract
A new interpretation of Dempster–Shafer conditional notions based directly upon the
mass assignments is provided. The masses of those propositions that may imply the
complement of the conditioning proposition are shown to be completely annulled by
the conditioning operation; conditioning may then be construed as a re-distribution of
the masses of some of these propositions to those that deﬁnitely imply the conditioning
proposition. A complete characterization of the propositions whose masses are annulled
without re-distribution, annulled with re-distribution and enhanced by the re-distribution
of masses is provided. A new evidence updating strategy that is composed of a linear
combination of the available evidence and the conditional evidence is also proposed. It
enables one to account for the integrity’ and inertia’ of the available evidence and its
ﬂexibility’ to updating by appropriate selection of the linear combination weights. Several
such strategies, including one that has a probabilistic interpretation, are also provided.
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1. Introduction
Methods of representing and dealing with uncertainty in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence have received considerable attention for several decades. Among the
many symbolic and numerical methods that have been proposed, the theory of
belief functions, also known as Dempster–Shafer (DS) theory, has gained in-
creasing recognition as a framework capable of representing and manipulating
uncertain and partial knowledge. The work of Dempster [1] and Shafer [2] has
led to a large number of important theoretical contributions in belief function
theory in the last two decades [3–10]. This theory has been successfully applied
in target tracking and identiﬁcation [11], robotics [12,13], map building [14,15],
document retrieval [16], computer vision [17], pattern classiﬁcation [18], au-
tomated task recognition [19], data mining [20–22], business and economics
[23], to name a few. The main advantage of DS theory lies in its ability to
numerically quantify the lack of knowledge in an eﬀective manner.
Updating or conditioning a body of evidence [24,25] modeled within the DS
framework prior to the availability of a particular piece of information plays
an important role in most of these applications. For example, consider a dis-
tributed decision network that has been deployed in a battleﬁeld. These types
of distributed decision-making environments have generated tremendous in-
terest in recent years due to their wide scope of applicability [26]. A typical
decision node in the hierarchy of such a network performs fusion of the in-
formation or data it obtains from its child nodes in the lower levels of the
hierarchy. Suppose this information from its child sensor nodes has enabled a
decision node to form a knowledge base regarding the location of certain
objects in the battleﬁeld. A DS modeling framework allows this to be carried
out via a suitable basic belief assignment on, for example, an appropriately
deﬁned grid [15]. Suppose then the node receives a new piece of evidence, from
perhaps a mobile robot or ground troops, that a particular enemy object has
been destroyed; hence the grid position previously occupied by this object is
now vacant. Clearly, the decision node now has to update its assignments in
light of this new evidence.
How willing’ or ﬂexible’ the decision node is for updating depends on its
perceived reliability’ of the source providing the new information. In situations
where the original knowledge base had been constructed from a vast amount of
evidence gathered from past experience and/or numerous experts, it may be
reluctant to compromise the integrity’ of its knowledge base and its inertia’
should not be ignored when updating is warranted. Various strategies for
updating evidence have been proposed over the years [24,25]. However, these
strategies do not appear to provide a convenient method to account for the
integrity and inertia of the evidence and its ﬂexibility to updating.
In this paper, we ﬁrst provide a new interpretation of DS conditional no-
tions based directly upon the corresponding mass assignments thus providing a
76 E.C. Kulasekere et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 36 (2004) 75–108
more intuitive interpretation of the conditioning operation and how it impacts
the remaining propositions. A new evidence updating strategy conditional to a
given proposition is then proposed. The strategy we propose is a linear com-
bination of the available evidence and the conditional evidence. The integrity
and inertia of the available evidence, and its ﬂexibility to updating, can then be
accounted for via these linear combination weights. Various strategies to
choose these linear combination weights are also proposed. One such strategy,
for which a probabilistic interpretation is provided, we believe is quite novel
and is expected to be extremely useful when no speciﬁc information regarding
the reliability of the incoming new evidence is available.
2. Preliminaries
Reals are denoted by R. Given the interval ½a; b in R, ‘½a; b denotes its
length, viz., ‘½a; b ¼ b a; its scalar multiplication is K  ½a; b ¼ ½Ka;Kb. The
addition of intervals ½a1; b1 and ½a2; b2 in R are deﬁned as ½a1; b1 þ ½a2; b2 ¼
½a1 þ a2; b1 þ b2. For set H, jHj denotes its cardinality; for a 2 R, jaj denotes
its absolute value.
2.1. Introduction to DS theory
DS theory [1,2] was motivated by various concerns including dissatisfaction
with certain axioms in probability. In the standard probability framework all
objects in the sample space are assigned a probability. Any object for which
there is no information is assigned an equal a-priori probability. Hence when
the degree of support for an event is known, the remainder of the support is
automatically assigned to the negation of the event. On the other hand, in DS
theory, mass assignments are carried out for the events, or propositions as they
are known, in the sample space. The mass assignments to non-singleton
propositions generate a notion of uncertainty. Objects for which there is no
information are not assigned an a-priori mass. Hence committing support for
an event does not necessarily imply that the remaining support is committed to
its negation; the lack of support for any particular event simply implies support
for all other events. In other words, the additivity axiom in the probability
formalism is relaxed in DS theory.
We denote the total set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive objects or
singletons via H ¼ fh1; h2; . . . ; hng. In DS theory, H is referred to as the frame
of discernment (FoD), or simply the frame, signifying the scope of our objec-
tive. A singleton represents the lowest level of information that is discernible by
the system. Given jHj ¼ n, the power set of H denoted by 2H, contains 2n
elements that are composed of all the subsets of H. The elements in 2H form
the propositions of interest in DS theory; therefore the mass assigned to a
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proposition is free to move into the individual singleton objects that form the
composite proposition thus generating the notion of ignorance. The support for
any such proposition is provided via a basic belief assignment (BBA).
Deﬁnition 1 (Basic belief assignment (BBA)). The mapping m : 2H 7! ½0; 1 is a
BBA for the frame H if: (i) mð;Þ ¼ 0; and (ii) PAH mðAÞ ¼ 1.
The set of propositions in a frame H that possess nonzero BBAs or masses
are called the focal elements of H; it is denoted byFðHÞ ¼fA  H : mðAÞ > 0g.
The triple fH;F;mg is referred to as the corresponding body of evidence (BoE).
The quantity mðAÞ measures the support assigned to proposition A only; the
belief assigned to A on the other hand must take into account the supports for
all proper subsets of A as well.
Deﬁnition 2 (Belief). Given a BoE fH;F;mg, the belief assigned to A  H is
Bel: 2H 7! ½0; 1 where BelðAÞ ¼PBA mðBÞ.
We use the notation cFðHÞ to denote those propositions in a frame H that
possess nonzero beliefs, viz., icFðHÞ ¼ fA  H : BelðAÞ > 0g. As will be evi-
dent later, propositions are conditioned with respect to propositions in cFðHÞ
only.
BelðAÞ represents the total support that can move into A without any
ambiguity. It can be characterized without reference to the underlying BBA
via.
Theorem 3 [2]. For a given FoD H, the function Bel : 2H 7! ½0; 1 constitutes a
belief function iff (i) Belð;Þ ¼ 0; (ii) BelðHÞ ¼ 1; and (iii) for every collection
fAigi¼1;n, Ai  H
Bel
[
i¼1;n
Ai
0@ 1AP X
If1;...;ng
I 6¼;
ð1ÞjIjþ1Bel
\
i2I
Ai
 !
: ð1Þ
The relative complement of proposition A with respect to X  H, denoted by
X  A, consists of all singletons not included in, and not implying, A, viz.,
X  A ¼ fh : h 2 X ; h 62 Ag. We use A to denote H A.
Now we may quantify the extent to which one doubts a proposition.
Deﬁnition 4 (Doubt). Given a BoE fH;F;mg, the doubt regarding A  H is
Dou : 2H 7! ½0; 1 where DouðAÞ ¼ BelðAÞ.
With Deﬁnitions 2 and 4 in place, the extent to which one ﬁnds a propo-
sition plausible may be quantiﬁed as follows:
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Deﬁnition 5 (Plausibility). Given a BoE fH;F;mg, the plausibility of A  H is
Pl : 2H 7! ½0; 1 where PlðAÞ ¼ 1DouðAÞ ¼ 1 BelðAÞ.
Indeed PlðAÞ indicates the extent to which one fails to doubt A, i.e., the
extent to which one ﬁnds A to be plausible. One may easily show that, for any
A  H, PlðAÞ ¼PB\A6¼; mðBÞ and PlðAÞPBelðAÞ.
The uncertainty associated with A, denoted by UnðAÞ, is the interval
UnðAÞ ¼ ½BelðAÞ;PlðAÞ. Note that 06 ‘½UnðAÞ6 minf1 BelðAÞ;PlðAÞg.
When each focal set contains only one element, i.e., mðAÞ ¼ 0 8jAj 6¼ 1,
belief functions become probability functions. In such a case, it is easy to show
the following:
(1) The BBA mðAÞ reduces to probability, i.e., mðAÞ ¼ PðAÞ.
(2) BelðAÞ ¼ PlðAÞ ¼ P ðAÞ.
(3) BelðA [ BÞ ¼ BelðAÞ þ BelðBÞ whenever A;B  H and A \ B ¼ ;.
(4) BelðAÞ þ BelðAÞ ¼ 1.
(5) ‘½UnðAÞ ¼ 0.
Dempster’s rule of combination (DRC) can be used to ﬁnd a new BBA (and
correspondingly a new BoE) that combines and takes into account several
BBAs (and correspondingly several BoEs) that span the same FoD.
Deﬁnition 6 (Dempster’s rule of combination (DRC)). The orthogonal sum de-
noted by m1  m2 : 2H 7! ½0; 1 of two BBAs m1 : 2H 7! ½0; 1 and m2 : 2H 7! ½0; 1
deﬁned over the same FoD H is the following: for 8A  H
ðm1  m2ÞðAÞ ¼
P
C;D:C\D¼A m1ðCÞm2ðDÞ
1PC;D:C\D¼; m1ðCÞm2ðDÞ 8C;D  H; ð2Þ
if X
C\D¼;
m1ðCÞm2ðDÞ < 1: ð3Þ
Note that m1  m2 : 2H 7! ½0; 1 is also a BBA in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.
The pair of propositions fC;Dg is said to be compatible if C \ D 6¼ ;; otherwise
they are said to be incompatible or disjoint. Two BBAs are said to be compatible
if (3) is satisﬁed. DRC is applicable to such compatible BBAs only.
3. Conditioning evidence in DS theory
Various notions of conditional belief and plausibility have been reported
previously [27–34]. The conditional measures in [27] are derived by relating
notions of inner and outer measures to DS notions. As had been pointed out in
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[27], same or similar expressions for these same conditional measures appear in
previous other articles as well [1,28,35].
Theorem 7 [27]. Given a BoE fH;F;mg and A 2 cFðHÞ, the conditional belief
BelðB jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1 and conditional plausibility PlðB jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1 assigned
to B  H are
BelðB jAÞ ¼ BelðA \ BÞ
BelðA \ BÞ þ PlðA BÞ ;
PlðB jAÞ ¼ PlðA \ BÞ
PlðA \ BÞ þ BelðA BÞ : ð4Þ
From now on, we use mðjAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1 with mð; jAÞ ¼ 0 to denote
the conditional BBA given A corresponding to the conditional notions
Belð jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1 and Plð jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1 in Theorem 7; its existence is in
fact demonstrated in [27].
Note that, Theorem 7 implies the following:
BelðB jAÞ ¼ BelðA \ B jAÞ and PlðB jAÞ ¼ PlðA \ B jAÞ; ð5Þ
i.e., conditioning of B with respect to A actually applies to the propositions that
are in common to both A and B. In other words, in evaluating the evidence we
have to support B when our view is restricted to only A, it only makes sense to
consider the propositions both A and B have access to!
The uncertainty intervals can be used for an alternate approach to interpret
conditional notions in the following manner as well: Consider a BoE
fH;F;mg and propositions A and B such that B  H and A 2 cFðHÞ. The
uncertainty intervals one may associate with A and B with respect to the FoD
H, viz., UnðAÞ and UnðBÞ, respectively, do not account for the contents’ of A
and hence no measure of the contribution’ of UnðAÞ towards UnðBÞ may be
extracted. Such a conditional uncertainty measure is exactly what would be
useful if the knowledge we have were to be restricted to what is available in A.
Indeed, what is desired would be an appropriate uncertainty interval for B that
uses only those focal elements of H that are used to compute BelðAÞ. The
diﬃculty stems from the fact that the BBA associated with only these focal
elements do not constitute a BBA in the sense of Deﬁnition 1. In other words,
given UnðAÞ, it is not possible to directly identify the contribution of UnðAÞ
towards UnðBÞ. The more appropriate notion is the conditional uncertainty
interval UnðB jAÞ ¼ ½BelðB jAÞ;PlðB jAÞ, B  H, A 2 cFðHÞ.
At this juncture, we must mention that these conditional notions in The-
orem 7 are not commutative’ in the sense that conditioning ﬁrst with respect
to A1 and subsequently with respect to A2 is not in general equivalent to
conditioning with respect to A1 \ A2. We comment on this issue further in
Section 6.
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3.1. Conditional BBA
The results in this section shed light on how conditioning impacts the ori-
ginal BBA prior to conditioning. This viewpoint, which is based directly on the
BBA, we believe is more intuitive in the sense that it enables one to discern how
the original masses are impacted upon receiving the conditioning evidence.
First, we identify those propositions whose masses are annulled with con-
ditioning.
Lemma 8. Given the BoE fH;F;mg and A 2 cFðHÞ, consider the conditional
BBA mð jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1. Then mðB jAÞ ¼ 0 whenever A \ B 6¼ ;.
Proof. Suppose 9B  H s.t. A \ B 6¼ ; and mðB jAÞ > 0. Then we must have
BelðB jAÞ > BelðA \ B jAÞ, because the non-zero mass mðB jAÞ contributes’
towards BelðB jAÞ but not towards BelðA \ B jAÞ. But, this contradicts (5)
which states that BelðB jAÞ ¼ BelðA \ B jAÞ. h
In other words, Lemma 8 states that, conditioning annuls masses of all those
propositions that may imply the complement of the conditioning proposition.
What happens to the masses of the remaining propositions, viz., those that
definitely imply the conditioning proposition?
To address this, we proceed as follows:
PlðAÞ  BelðA \ BÞ  PlðA BÞ
¼ PlðAÞ  BelðA \ BÞ  ½1 BelðA [ BÞ
¼ PlðAÞ  BelðA \ BÞ  ½PlðAÞ þ BelðAÞ þ BelðA [ BÞ
¼ BelðA [ BÞ  BelðAÞ  BelðA \ BÞ; ð6Þ
where we have used the relationships PlðAÞ þ BelðAÞ ¼ 1 and PlðA BÞþ
BelðA [ BÞ ¼ 1. But, we realize that
BelðA [ BÞ  BelðAÞ  BelðA \ BÞ ¼
X
X :X2SðA\BÞ
mðX Þ; ð7Þ
where
SðA \ BÞ ¼: fX 2FðHÞ : X ¼ D [ C s:t: ; 6¼ D  A; ; 6¼ C  A \ Bg:
ð8Þ
Hence we have
PlðAÞ 
X
X :X2SðA\BÞ
mðX Þ ¼ BelðA \ BÞ þ PlðA BÞ: ð9Þ
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Therefore we may express the conditional belief as
BelðB jAÞ ¼ BelðA \ BÞ
BelðA \ BÞ þ PlðA BÞ ¼
BelðA \ BÞ
PlðAÞ PX :X2SðA\BÞ mðX Þ : ð10Þ
It is this expression that we intend to use to further study the conditional
BBA. For convenience, from now on, with no loss of generality, we assume
that B  A; after all, Lemma 8 already implies that mðB jAÞ ¼ 0 whenever
A \ B 6¼ ;. For this case, (10) reduces to
BelðB jAÞ ¼ BelðBÞ
BelðBÞ þ PlðA BÞ ¼
BelðBÞ
PlðAÞ  NðBÞ ; ð11Þ
where we use the short-hand notation
NðBÞ ¼
X
X :X2SðBÞ
mðX Þ: ð12Þ
Note that
SðBÞ ¼: fX 2FðHÞ : X ¼ D [ C s:t: ; 6¼ D  A; ; 6¼ C  B  Ag: ð13Þ
For the discussion to follow, it will also be convenient to deﬁne the fol-
lowing:
S^ðX Þ ¼: fB  A : B  A \ X where X 2FðHÞ and ; 6¼ A \ Xg: ð14Þ
See Fig. 1.
Use Deﬁnition 2 in (11) to get
mðB jAÞ ¼ 1
PlðAÞ PX :X2SðBÞ mðX Þ
X
C:CB
mðCÞ 
X
C:CB
mðC jAÞ: ð15Þ
Let us study (15) in more detail: observe that mðB jAÞ, for a given B, depends
only on the following quantities:
Fig. 1. (a) The set SðBÞ, B  A and (b) the set cSðX Þ, X 2FðHÞ, ; 6¼ A \ X .
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(1) PlðAÞ––plausibility of the conditioning proposition which is independent of
the proposition being conditioned.
(2) mðCÞ, C  B––originally assigned masses of propositions that definitely
imply the proposition being conditioned.
(3) mðX Þ, X 2SðBÞ––originally assigned masses of propositions that may
imply A and B but definitely not A B.
(4) mðC jAÞ, C  B––conditional masses of propositions that definitely imply
the proposition being conditioned; sinceSðCÞ SðBÞ, 8C  B, these con-
ditional masses in turn depend only on mðX Þ, X 2 SðBÞ.
(5) Perhaps more important is to observe that mðCÞ, C  A––masses of prop-
ositions that definitely imply A––make no contribution towards any prop-
osition being conditioned.
With the above development in place, is it possible to view the conditioning
operation as an annulment and re-distribution of the masses of those propo-
sitions that may imply the complement of the conditioning proposition? If so,
do these masses get re-distributed or not re-distributed (which will require a re-
normalization)? How exactly does this re-distribution take place?
To address these questions, we now provide an explicit recursive formula
that enables one to compute the conditional BBA. First, express (11) asX
C:CB
PlðAÞmðC jAÞ ¼
X
C:CB
½mðCÞ þ NðBÞmðC jAÞ: ð16Þ
Subtract
P
C:CB NðCÞmðC jAÞ from each side and re-arrange terms to get
DðBÞ ¼
X
C:CB
½NðBÞ  NðCÞmðC jAÞ 
X
C:CB
DðCÞ; ð17Þ
where we use the notation
DðBÞ ¼ ½PlðAÞ  NðBÞmðB jAÞ  mðBÞ: ð18Þ
Then we have
Lemma 9. Given the BoE fH;F;mg and A 2 cFðHÞ, consider the conditional
BBA mð jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1. Then, for B  A and every collection fDig such that
C  D  B,
DðBÞ ¼
X
C:CB
NðBÞ 
X
I 6¼;;If1;...;2jBjjCj1g
ð1ÞjIjþ1N
\
i2I
Di
 !264
375mðC jAÞ
¼
X
C:CB
NðBÞ 
XjBj1
i¼jCj
ð1ÞjBj1i
X
D:CDB;jDj¼i
NðDÞ
" #
mðC jAÞ: ð19Þ
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Proof. The fact that the two alternate expressions in the right-hand side of (19)
are identical is easy to see. We establish the claim via the second expression
through induction on jBj ¼ f1; 2; . . .g.
ii(i) jBj ¼ 1 case. In this case, (19) yields DðBÞ ¼ 0, which may be veriﬁed to be
true via (17).
i(ii) jBj ¼ f1; 2; . . . ;Mg cases. Suppose the claim is true for 16 jBj6M .
(iii) jBj ¼ M þ 1 case. Consider (17). Note that the sets C : C  B in the last
term on the right-hand side of (17) satisfy the property jCj6M . Hence
we may apply (19) to getX
C:CB
DðCÞ
¼
X
C:CB
X
D:DC
NðCÞ 
XjCj1
i¼jDj
ð
"
 1ÞjCj1i
X
E:DEC;jEj¼i
NðEÞ
#
mðD jAÞ
¼
X
C:CB
X
D:CDB
NðDÞ 
XjDj1
i¼jCj
ð
"
 1ÞjDj1i
X
E:CED;jEj¼i
NðEÞ
#
mðC jAÞ:
ð20Þ
Substitute in (17) to get
DðBÞ ¼
X
C:CB
NðBÞmðC jAÞ

X
C:CB
X
D:CDB
NðDÞ
XjDj1
i¼jCj
ð
"
 1ÞjDj1i
X
E:CED;jEj¼i
NðEÞ
#
mðC jAÞ:
ð21Þ
Now, compare (19) and (21). Clearly, the claim will be established if we can
show the following: for a given B : B  A and C : C  BXjBj1
i¼jCj
ð1ÞjBj1i
X
D:CDB;jDj¼i
NðDÞ
¼
X
D:CDB
NðDÞ 
XjDj1
i¼jCj
ð
"
 1ÞjDj1i
X
E:CED;jEj¼i
NðEÞ
#
: ð22Þ
To verify this identity, consider the coeﬃcient associated with the arbitrary
term NðX Þ, X  B:
(iii.a) Left-hand side of (22). Only one coeﬃcient is generated; it corresponds
to i ¼ jX j. This yields ð1ÞjBj1jX j.
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(iii.b) Right-hand side of (22). Only one coeﬃcient of value 1 is generated by the
ﬁrst term; to get the coeﬃcients generated by the second term, we need to
put i ¼ jX j and consider all sets D : X  D  B (D ¼ X need not be con-
sidered since the second term vanishes in this situation). This yields
1
X
D:XDB
ð1ÞjDj1jX j ¼ 1
XjBj1
i¼jX jþ1
jBj  jX j
i jX j
 
ð1Þi1jX j
¼ 1þ
XjBj1
i¼jX jþ1
jBj  jX j
i jX j
 
ð1ÞijX j
¼ 1þ
XjBj1jX j
i¼1
jBj  jX j
i
 
ð1Þi
¼ 1þ
XjBjjX j
i¼0
jBj  jX j
i
 
ð1Þi
 jBj  jX jjBj  jX j
 
ð1ÞjBjjX j jBj  jX j
0
 
ð1Þ0
¼  jBj  jX jjBj  jX j
 
ð1ÞjBjjX j ¼ð1ÞjBj1jX j; ð23Þ
where we used the fact that
PjBjjX j
i¼0
jBj  jX j
i
 
ð1Þi ¼ 0.
Hence, (22) indeed holds true. This establishes the claim in (19). h
In eﬀect, Lemma 9 demonstrates the fact that the conditional BBA of a
proposition is completely determined by the conditional BBAs of those
propositions that imply it. With this in place, it is easy to establish.
Lemma 10. Given the BoE fH;F;mg and A 2 cFðHÞ, consider the conditional
BBA mð jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1. Then
mðBÞ
PlðAÞ PX :X2SðBÞ mðX Þ 6mðB jAÞ6 BelðBÞPlðAÞ PX :X2SðBÞ mðX Þ 8B  A:
ð24Þ
Proof. The right-hand side inequality simply claims that mðB jAÞ6BelðB jAÞ
(see (9)) which is of course obvious. The left-hand side inequality claims that
DðBÞP 0. To show this, consider (19) and observe that[
i2I
Di ¼ B for jCj 6¼ jBj  1;C for jCj ¼ jBj  1:

ð25Þ
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Now noting the deﬁnition of NðBÞ in (12), it is clear that NðÞ satisﬁes the
following property of belief functions (although it is not necessarily a belief
function):
NðBÞP
X
I
ð1ÞjIjþ1N
\
i2I
Di
 !
; for ; 6¼ I  f1; . . . ; 2jBjjCj  1g: ð26Þ
Thus DðBÞP 0, as claimed. h
Lemma 10 implies that
mðBÞ6 mðBÞ
PlðAÞ PX :X2SðBÞ mðX Þ 6mðB jAÞ 8B  A; ð27Þ
i.e., the masses of those propositions that definitely imply the conditioning
proposition cannot decrease with conditioning.
In summary, Lemmas 8 and 10 enable us to conclude that, conditioning
annuls the masses of all propositions that may imply the complement of the
conditioning proposition while increasing or keeping unchanged the masses of
all propositions that definitely imply the conditioning proposition. Of this
latter class of propositions, we can actually identify those that are guaranteed
to increase after conditioning:
Lemma 11. Given the BoE fH;F;mg and A 2 cFðHÞ, consider the conditional
BBA mð jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1. Then mðBÞ < mðB jAÞ 8B  A, B 2FðHÞ, if
max BelðAÞ;PX :X2SðBÞ mðX Þn o > 0.
Proof. From (15) it is clear that mðBÞ < mðB jAÞ, 8B  A, if mðBÞ <
mðBÞ
PlðAÞ
P
X :X2SðBÞ mðX Þ
. Since B 2FðHÞ, we have mðBÞ > 0. Hence, this is equivalent
to
PlðAÞ 
X
X :X2SðBÞ
mðX Þ < 1()
X
X :X2SðBÞ
mðX Þ P 0; if PlðAÞ < 1;
> 0; if PlðAÞ ¼ 1:

ð28Þ
The claim then follows. h
We also have
Lemma 12. Given the BoE fH;F;mg and A 2 cFðHÞ, consider the conditional
BBA mð jAÞ : 2H 7! ½0; 1. Then the following are true:
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ii(i)
mðAÞ
BelðAÞ 6mðA jAÞ6 1: ð29Þ
i(ii) For all B  A s.t. mðBÞ ¼ BelðBÞ
mðB jAÞ ¼ mðBÞ
PlðAÞ PX :X2SðBÞ mðX Þ ¼ mðBÞmðBÞ þ PlðA BÞ : ð30Þ
(iii) For all B  A s.t. B 2TðAÞ
mðB jAÞ ¼ mðBÞ
PlðAÞ ; ð31Þ
where TðAÞ¼: fB  A  H : SðBÞ ¼ ;g.
Proof
ii(i) It is clear that PlðAÞ PX :X2SðAÞ mðX Þ ¼ BelðAÞ. Now the claim follows by
direct application of Lemma 10.
i(ii) When mðBÞ ¼ BelðBÞ, the upper and lower bounds in Lemma 10 converge;
the claim then follows directly.
(iii) Note that (11) implies that BelðB jAÞ ¼ BelðBÞ
PlðAÞ 8B 2TðAÞ. The claim then
follows when one notices that B 2TðAÞ ) C 2TðAÞ 8C  B. h
At this juncture, we wish to make several observations.
(1) Lemma 10 implies that the conditional mass of all propositions in B  A
must strictly increase whenever BelðAÞ > 0() PlðAÞ < 1.
(2) Item (i) of Lemma 12 implies that the conditional mass of the conditioning
proposition cannot decrease. When BelðAÞ < 1, mðA jAÞ must necessarily
exceed mðAÞ. When mðAÞ ¼ BelðAÞ, mðA jAÞ ¼ 1 and the mass of every
other proposition is zero; a special case for which this is applicable is when
A is a singleton proposition.
(3) Special cases for which item (ii) of Lemma 12 are applicable are the follow-
ing:
(a) When B is a singleton proposition; and/or
(b) BelðBÞ ¼ 0 (which implies mðBÞ ¼ 0)––this situation actually yields
mðB jAÞ ¼ 0, 8B  A s.t. BelðBÞ ¼ 0, i.e., the mass of a proposition hav-
ing zero belief remains at zero with conditioning.
(4) Item (iii) of Lemma 12 exposes an important fact: one may view each ele-
ment in TðAÞ as a proposition whose mass is not further reﬁned’ (except
perhaps due to re-normalization by PlðAÞ) with conditioning. It is only the
masses of those propositions that render a non-empty SðBÞ that may get
further reﬁned with conditioning.
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3.1.1. Summary: BBA-based interpretation of conditioning
Summarizing the results in Lemmas 8–12, we may now interpret the con-
ditioning operation as part annulment with re-distribution and part annulment
without re-distribution of the originally allocated masses of propositions that
may imply the complement of the conditioning proposition, viz., X  H s.t.
A \ X 6¼ ;
(1) Masses that are annulled without re-distribution. Masses of propositions
X  H s.t. X  A are annulled but not re-distributed; this generates the
re-normalization factor PlðAÞ. See Fig. 2(a).
(2) Masses that are annulled with re-distribution. Masses of propositions X  H
s.t. A \ X 6¼ ; and A \ X 6¼ ; are annulled but re-distributed toward
B 2 S^ðX Þ. See Fig. 2(b).
(3) Masses that cannot decrease. Masses of the remaining propositions (i.e.,
propositions B s.t. B  A) cannot decrease with conditioning. No proposi-
tion in T ðAÞ gets further reﬁned (except due to the re-normalization factor
PlðAÞ in (2)). The remaining masses of propositions B  Amay beneﬁt from
the re-distribution in (2). In particular, only mðX Þ 8X 2SðBÞ, can contrib-
ute towards mðB jAÞ, B  A. See Fig. 2(c).
Fig. 2. Impact of conditioning on original mass assignment.
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Example 13. It is perhaps best to illustrate the above notions via an example.
Consider the situation in Table 1 where H ¼ fa; b; c; dg and the conditioning
proposition is A ¼ fa; b; cg ) A ¼ fdg. The deductions one may make re-
garding the conditional BBA are indicated as well. Note that
SðfagÞ ¼ Sðfa; bgÞ ¼ fa; dg; Sðfa; cgÞ ¼ SðAÞ ¼ ffa; dg; fc; dgg;
Sðfb; cgÞ ¼ fc; dg ð32Þ
and
S^ðfa; dgÞ ¼ fa; fa; bg; fa; cg; fa; b; cgg;
S^ðfc; dgÞ ¼ fc; fa; cg; fb; cg; fa; b; cgg: ð33Þ
Table 2 shows the computed conditional notions.
3.2. Conditional belief and plausibility
We have already obtained several important results regarding how condi-
tioning aﬀects the original BBA. In this section, we make several observations
regarding the conditional belief and plausibility notions. These provide further
insight into the conditioning operation and will be useful in the development of
the updating strategy proposed in Section 4.
Table 1
Illustrative example––originally cast BBA. H ¼ fa; b; c; dg and A ¼ fa; b; cg
B BelðBÞ PlðBÞ mðBÞ Deductions regarding mðB jAÞ
a 0.2 0.5 0.2 PlðAÞ < 1) mðfag jAÞ > mðfagÞ and SðfagÞ
contributes
b 0.2 0.5 0.2 fbg 2TðAÞ ) mðfbg jAÞ ¼ mðfbgÞ=PlðAÞ
c 0 0.2 0 mðfcgÞ ¼ BelðfcgÞ ¼ 0) mðfcg jAÞ ¼ 0
d 0.1 0.3 0.1 fdg  A) mðfdg jAÞ ¼ 0 and mass is not
re-distributed
fa; bg 0.6 0.8 0.2 PlðAÞ < 1) mðfa; bg jAÞ > mðfa; bgÞ and
Sðfa; bgÞ contributes
fa; cg 0.2 0.7 0 PlðAÞ < 1) mðfa; cg jAÞ > mðfa; cgÞ and
Sðfa; cgÞ contributes
fa; dg 0.4 0.7 0.1 A \ fa; dg 6¼ ; ) mðfa; dg jAÞ ¼ 0 and mass is
re-distributed to S^ðfa; dgÞ
fb; cg 0.3 0.6 0.1 PlðAÞ < 1) mðfb; cg jAÞ > mðfb; cgÞ and
Sðfb; cgÞ contributes
fc; dg 0.2 0.4 0.1 A \ fc; dg 6¼ ; ) mðfc; dg jAÞ ¼ 0 and mass is
re-distributed to S^ðfc; dgÞ
fa; b; cg 0.7 0.9 0 PlðAÞ < 1) mðfAg jAÞ > mðfAgÞ and SðAÞ
contributes
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3.2.1. Trivial cases
It is easy to see that Belð; jAÞ ¼ Plð; jAÞ ¼ 0 and BelðH jAÞ ¼ PlðH jAÞ ¼ 1.
3.2.2. Monotonicity
Since belief and plausibility functions are monotone with respect to set in-
clusion, for B1  B2, BelðB1 jAÞ6BelðB2 jAÞ and PlðB1 jAÞ6PlðB2 jAÞ.
3.2.3. A ¼ H case
In this case, BelðB jAÞ ¼ BelðBÞ and PlðB jAÞ ¼ PlðBÞ.
3.2.4. B ¼ A case
In this case, BelðA jAÞ ¼ PlðA jAÞ ¼ 1.
3.2.5. A  B, B 6¼ ;, case
In this case, BelðB jAÞ ¼ PlðB jAÞ ¼ 1.
3.2.6. Probabilistic BBA
In a probability framework when mðÞ ¼ BelðÞ ¼ PlðÞ ¼: P ðÞ, we have
Table 2
Illustrative example––conditional BBA
B BelðB jAÞ PlðB jAÞ mðB jAÞ
a 0:2
0:8
0:5
0:8
0:2
0:8
b
0:2
0:9
0:5
0:7
0:2
0:9
c 0
0:2
0:5
0
d 0 0 0
fa; bg 0:6
0:8
1.0
0:25
0:9
fa; cg 0:2
0:7
0:7
0:9
0:02
ð0:7Þð0:8Þ
fa; dg 0:2
0:8
0:5
0:8
0
fb; cg 0:3
0:8
0:6
0:8
0:11
ð0:8Þð0:9Þ
fc; dg 0 0:2
0:5
0
fa; b; cg 1 1 0:031ð0:7Þð0:8Þð0:9Þ
H ¼ fa; b; c; dg and A ¼ fa; b; cg.
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BelðB jAÞ ¼ PlðB jAÞ ¼ P ðA \ BÞ
P ðA \ BÞ þ P ðA BÞ ¼
P ðA \ BÞ
P ðAÞ ¼ P ðB jAÞ:
ð34Þ
These observations illustrate that the notions in Theorem 7 can be consid-
ered natural extensions’ [36], and hence act as generalizations, of those in
Deﬁnitions 2 and 5.
With the above discussion in mind, these conditional notions can be used as
measures to indicate the support provided by proposition A for another
proposition B; or, to be more precise, for the propositions in common to both
A and B, viz., A \ B. Unlike the direct calculation of the belief using the
complete BoE, these measures explicitly depend on the speciﬁc propositions in
A that condition the propositions in B.
4. Updating evidence
Now that we have quantiﬁed how a given proposition A contributes to
another proposition B (actually to A \ B), how should we update our originally
assigned support for B? In [37], perhaps for the ﬁrst time, this updated belief of
B conditional to A––which we denote by BelAðBÞ––is taken to be a linear
combination of the originally assigned belief BelðBÞ and the conditional belief
BelðB jAÞ. This strategy is simple, works directly on belief functions instead of
the BBA [23] and accounts for both the individual evidence cast on B and the
evidence gathered from what are common to both A and B in a uniﬁed manner.
Moreover, as we will presently demonstrate, it allows one to accommodate the
integrity and inertia of the available evidence and its ﬂexibility to updating; it
also possesses most of the properties that one expects from a reasonable
updating strategy.
4.1. Updating strategy
Consider the following linear combination of mðBÞ and mðB jAÞ for updating
the mass of B:
mAðBÞ ¼ aAmðBÞ þ bAmðB jAÞ; ð35Þ
where faA; bAg are parameters dependent on the conditioning proposition A.
We use the subscript A to distinguish quantities that have been updated con-
ditional to A. Note that mAð;Þ ¼ 0 whileX
B:BH
mAðBÞ ¼ 1() aA þ bA ¼ 1: ð36Þ
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The corresponding updated belief is then
BelAðBÞ ¼ aABelðBÞ þ bABelðB jAÞ: ð37Þ
Note that BelAð;Þ ¼ 0 and BelAðHÞ ¼ 1; the validity of item (iii) of Theorem
3 for BelAðÞ follows from the fact that the convex sum of belief functions
constitutes another belief function.
Finally, the updated plausibility PlAðBÞ may be obtained via
PlAðBÞ ¼ 1 BelAðBÞ ¼ 1 ½aABelðBÞ þ bABelðB jAÞ
¼ aA½1 BelðBÞ þ bA½1 BelðB jAÞ
¼ aAPlðBÞ þ bAPlðB jAÞ; ð38Þ
where we have used (36).
With the above development in place, we propose
Deﬁnition 14 (Updated BBA, belief and plausibility). Consider the BoE
fH;F;mg and a given A  cFðHÞ. Then, for an arbitrary B  H, deﬁne the
following:
ii(i) Updated BBA of B given A is mAðBÞ : 2H 7! ½0:1 where
mAðBÞ ¼ aAmðBÞ þ bAmðB jAÞ: ð39Þ
i(ii) The corresponding updated belief of B given A is BelA : 2H 7! ½0; 1 where
BelAðBÞ ¼ aABelðBÞ þ bABelðB jAÞ: ð40Þ
(iii) The corresponding updated plausibility of B given A is PlA : 2H 7! ½0; 1
where
PlAðBÞ ¼ 1 BelAðBÞ ¼ aAPlðBÞ þ bAPlðB jAÞ: ð41Þ
Here faA; bAg are non-negative parameters dependent on the conditioning
proposition A such that aA þ bA ¼ 1.
For B  H and A 2 cFðHÞ, we may also deﬁne a corresponding updated
uncertainty interval as [37]
UnAðBÞ ¼ ½BelAðBÞ;PlAðBÞ ¼ aAUnðBÞ þ bAUnðB jAÞ: ð42Þ
4.2. Properties of the updating strategy
We now discuss some of the properties of the updating strategy in Deﬁnition
14.
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4.2.1. Updated BBA
From Lemmas 8–12, we observe the following:
mAðBÞ
¼ aAmðBÞ6mðBÞ; for B  H s:t: A \ B 6¼ ;;
P aA þ bA
PlðAÞ PX :X2SðBÞ mðX Þ
" #
mðBÞPmðBÞ; for B  A:
8><>:
ð43Þ
For those propositions in A that are not reﬁned from conditioning, we may be
more precise:
mAðBÞ ¼ aA þ bA
PlðAÞ
 
mðBÞPmðBÞ; 8B  A s:t: B 2TðAÞ: ð44Þ
In other words, the updating strategy in Deﬁnition 14 aﬀects the originally
assigned masses as follows:
i(i) Masses of propositions that may imply the complement of the conditioning
proposition are decreased (unless aA ¼ 1).
(ii) Masses of propositions that definitely imply the conditioning proposition
are increased (or at least not decreased).
Eqs. (43) and (44) bring to light the following important observation as well:
propositions that do not allow further reﬁnement in their mass when being
conditioned do not get updated (except the changes due to re-normalization)
either. In fact, we notice that
mAðBÞ ¼ mðBÞ 8B  A s:t: B 2TðAÞ; whenever PlðAÞ ¼ 1: ð45Þ
Clearly, these constitute important intuitively appealing properties that one
expects from a reasonable updating strategy.
4.2.2. Updated belief and plausibility
4.2.2.1. Trivial cases. It is easy to see that BelAð;Þ ¼ PlAð;Þ ¼ 0 and
BelAðHÞ ¼ PlAðHÞ ¼ 1.
4.2.2.2. Monotonicity. The fact that BelðBÞ and BelðB jAÞ each monotonically
increases with respect to B implies that the same is true with BelAðBÞ; PlAðBÞ
possesses the same property as well.
4.2.2.3. A ¼ H case. In this case, BelHðBÞ ¼ BelðBÞ and PlHðBÞ ¼ PlðBÞ.
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4.2.2.4. B ¼ A case. Note that BelAðAÞ ¼ 1 aA½1 BelðAÞ and PlAðAÞ ¼ 1
aA½1 PlðAÞ. Now it is easy to see that BelAðAÞPBelðAÞ and PlAðAÞPPlðAÞ,
i.e., the occurrence of A improves its own belief and plausibility assignments.
We also get
aA ¼
1 BelAðAÞ
1 BelðAÞ ¼
1 PlAðAÞ
1 PlðAÞ for BelðAÞ6PlðAÞ < 1;
1 BelAðAÞ
1 BelðAÞ for BelðAÞ < PlðAÞ ¼ 1;
arbitrary in ½0; 1; for BelðAÞ ¼ PlðAÞ ¼ 1:
8>>><>>>:
ð46Þ
4.2.2.5. A  B;B 6¼ ;, case. In this case, BelAðBÞ ¼ aABelðBÞ þ bA PBelðBÞ and
PlAðBÞ ¼ aAPlðBÞ þ bA PPlðBÞ.
4.2.2.6. Updated conditional. Another very intuitively appealing conclusion
may be drawn as follows: from (40) and (41), note that
BelAðA \ BÞ ¼ aABelðA \ BÞ þ bABelðB jAÞ;
PlAðA BÞ ¼ aAPlðA BÞ þ bAPlðA B jAÞ
¼ aAPlðA BÞ þ bAPlðB jAÞ:
ð47Þ
Hence
BelAðB jAÞ ¼ BelAðA \ BÞ
BelAðA \ BÞ þ PlAðA BÞ
¼ aABelðA \ BÞ þ bABelðB jAÞ
aA½BelðA \ BÞ þ PlðA BÞ þ bA½BelðB jAÞ þ PlðB jAÞ
¼ aABelðA \ BÞ þ bABelðB jAÞ
aA½BelðA \ BÞ þ PlðA BÞ þ bA
¼ BelðB jAÞ; ð48Þ
i.e., BelðB jAÞ is invariant with updating.
4.2.2.7. Repeated conditioning. Let us use the superscript ðiÞ to denote the i
times repeated conditioning with respect to proposition A via repeated appli-
cation of (40), i.e.
Bel
ðiþ1Þ
A ðBÞ ¼ aðiÞA BelðiÞA ðBÞ þ bðiÞA BelðiÞA ðB jAÞ 8iP 0; ð49Þ
where i ¼ 0 and i ¼ 1 denote terms related to the originally cast BBA and the
ﬁrst update respectively. Then
Bel
ð2Þ
A ðBÞ ¼ að1ÞA ½að0ÞA BelðBÞ þ bð0ÞA BelðB jAÞ þ bð1ÞA Belð1ÞA ðB jAÞ
¼ BelðB jAÞ þ að0ÞA að1ÞA ½BelðBÞ  BelðB jAÞ; ð50Þ
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where we have used the invariance of BelðB jAÞ in (48) and aðiÞA þ bðiÞA ¼ 1 8iP 0.
Continuing in this manner, one may show that
Bel
ðnÞ
A ðBÞ ¼ BelðB jAÞ þ
Yn1
i¼0
aðiÞA ½BelðBÞ  BelðB jAÞ 8nP 0; ð51Þ
where fað0ÞA ; bð0ÞA g¼: faA; bAg. This again results in the intuitively appealing result
lim
n!1
Bel
ðnÞ
A ðBÞ ¼ BelðB jAÞ; limn!1Bel
ðnÞ
A ðAÞ ¼ 1: ð52Þ
4.2.2.8. Updated incremental. We also have
BelAðBÞ  BelAðA \ BÞ ¼ aA½BelðBÞ  BelðA \ BÞ;
PlAðBÞ  PlAðA \ BÞ ¼ aA½PlðBÞ  PlðA \ BÞ:
ð53Þ
4.2.2.9. Behavior of updates. When is the updated notion higher than its cor-
responding original assignment? This is of course true whenever B  A (as can
be inferred from (43). Another way to address this question is to note that
BelAðBÞ  BelðBÞ ¼ ð1 aAÞ½BelðB jAÞ  BelðBÞ;
PlAðBÞ  PlðBÞ ¼ ð1 aAÞ½PlðB jAÞ  PlðBÞ;
UnAðBÞ UnðBÞ ¼ ð1 aAÞ½UnðB jAÞ UnðBÞ:
ð54Þ
The dynamics of these incrementals of belief, plausibility and uncertainty
interval are therefore identical. It is now easy to arrive at the following inter-
esting conclusions:
(1) BelðBÞPBelðB jAÞ and PlðBÞPPlðB jAÞ guarantee no increase in the up-
dates for the belief and plausibility functions respectively; the minimum
updates are limited by BelðB jAÞ and PlðB jAÞ respectively. Moreover,
UnðBÞPUnðB jAÞ guarantees no deterioration of the uncertainty interval;
the maximum improvement is limited by UnðB jAÞ.
(2) BelðBÞ6BelðB jAÞ and PlðBÞ6PlðB jAÞ guarantee no decrease in the up-
dates for the belief and plausibility functions respectively; the maximum
updates are limited by BelðB jAÞ and PlðB jAÞ respectively. Moreover,
UnðBÞ6UnðB jAÞ guarantees no improvement of the uncertainty interval;
the maximum deterioration is limited by UnðB jAÞ.
These observations are summarized in Fig. 3.
4.3. Linear combination weights
In this section, we propose several strategies that enable the selection of the
linear combination weights faA; bAg.
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4.3.1. Inertia of available evidence
The weights faA; bAg can be interpreted as measures that indicate the ﬂexi-
bility or inertia of the originally cast evidence to updating when presented with
the incoming conditional proposition.
Deﬁnition 15 (Inertia of available evidence based updating). Consider the evi-
dence updating strategy in Deﬁnition 14.
ii(i) The choice faA; bAg ¼ f1; 0g is called the infinite inertia based (II-based)
updating strategy.
i(ii) The choice faA; bAg ¼ f0; 1g is called the zero inertia based (ZI-based) up-
dating strategy.
(iii) The choice faA; bAg ¼ f NNþ1 ; 1Nþ1g, where N refers to the number of pieces’
of evidence the available evidence is based upon is called the proportional
inertia based (PI-based) updating strategy.
We make several observations regarding these updating strategies:
(1) II-based updating. This can account for the complete inﬂexibility of the
available evidence towards changes (e.g., when it perceives the incoming
evidence to be completely unreliable, when the original BoE is formed from
a vast collection of reliable data thus generating a high inertia, etc.).
Fig. 3. Behavior of the updates BelAðBÞ, PlAðBÞ and UnAðBÞ.
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(2) ZI-based updating. This can account for the complete ﬂexibility of the
available evidence towards changes (e.g., when it perceives the incoming
evidence to be completely reliable, when the original BoE has little or no
credible knowledge base to begin with, etc.).
(3) PI-based updating. This strategy treats each piece’ of already gathered
evidence and the new piece’ of incoming evidence as having equal inertia.
4.3.2. Integrity of available evidence
Suppose that the conditioning proposition A has just occurred, and we are in
the process of updating the support for all the propositions (including A itself)
armed with this new evidence. Then, for the integrity of the originally cast
evidence to be maintained, it is reasonable to enforce BelAðAÞ6PlðAÞ. The
corresponding weights faA; bAg we believe can be considered the most rea-
sonable choices if we are unwilling to compromise the evidence that had al-
ready been cast prior to the arrival of the new evidence. In other words, in
order not to contradict the originally cast evidence, we allow BelAðAÞ to in-
crease to PlðAÞ––but no more! Substituting this in (40) we get
Deﬁnition 16 (Integrity of available evidence based updating). Consider the ev-
idence updating strategy in Deﬁnition 14. The integrity of available evidence
based (IAE-based) updating strategy refers to
aA 2
1 PlðAÞ
1 BelðAÞ ; 1
 
for BelðAÞ < 1;
½0; 1 for BelðAÞ ¼ PlðAÞ ¼ 1:
8<: ð55Þ
We make several observations regarding this IAE-based updating strategy:
(1) aA achieves its upper bound, i.e., aA ¼ 1. This means that the current
knowledge base is not changed. It indicates that the BoE is least ﬂexible
to the incoming evidence, viz., the II-based updating strategy.
(2) aA achieves its lower bound, i.e., aA ¼ 1PlðAÞ1BelðAÞ. This yields
BelAðAÞ ¼ PlðAÞ;
PlAðAÞ ¼
½PlðAÞ  BelðAÞ þ PlðAÞ½1 PlðAÞ
1 BelðAÞ for BelðAÞ < 1;
1 for BelðAÞ ¼ PlðAÞ ¼ 1:
8<:
ð56Þ
It indicates that the BoE is most ﬂexible to the incoming evidence to the
extent that its own evidence is not compromised. We refer to this as the most
flexible IAE-based updating strategy. Note that, in this case, PlAðAÞPPlðAÞ
with equality holding true iﬀ aA ¼ 1 and/or PlðAÞ ¼ 1; PlAðAÞ ¼ 1 iﬀ
PlðAÞ ¼ 1.
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(3) aA violates its lower bound, i.e., aA <
1PlðAÞ
1BelðAÞ. This yields
BelAðAÞ > PlðAÞ;
PlAðAÞ
>
½PlðAÞ  BelðAÞ þ PlðAÞ½1 PlðAÞ
1 BelðAÞ for BelðAÞ < 1;
¼ 1 for BelðAÞ ¼ PlðAÞ ¼ 1:
8><>:
ð57Þ
It indicates that the BoE is willing to compromise the integrity of the
originally cast evidence. A high perceived reliability associated with the in-
coming evidence may convince the BoE to adopt such an updating strategy.
4.3.2.1. A probabilistic interpretation. What is most interesting is that we can
provide a probabilistic interpretation to the most ﬂexible IAE-based updating
strategy. To proceed, let BelðÞ ¼ PlðÞ¼: PðÞ. For convenience, we also assume
that A and B are mutually exhaustive, i.e., A [ B ¼ H. Hence
P ðAÞ þ P ðBÞ  PðA \ BÞ ¼ 1: ð58Þ
Previously, in (48), we showed that an updating strategy comprised of a
linear combination of P ðBÞ and P ðB jAÞ implies the latter to be invariant, i.e.,
PAðB jAÞ ¼ P ðB jAÞ () PAðA \ BÞPAðAÞ ¼
P ðA \ BÞ
P ðAÞ : ð59Þ
Hence let 3
PAðAÞ ¼ cAP ðAÞ; PAðA \ BÞ ¼ cAPðA \ BÞ: ð60Þ
Since (58) must be true after updating as well, we have
PAðBÞ ¼ 1 PAðAÞ þ PAðA \ BÞ ¼ 1 cA½P ðAÞ  P ðA \ BÞ
¼ 1 cA½1 P ðBÞ ¼ ð1 cAÞ þ cAP ðBÞ: ð61Þ
Now, suppose m instances out of a total of M correspond to event A and the
next instance corresponds to A as well. Then we may write
P ðAÞ ¼ m
M
; PAðAÞ ¼ mþ 1M þ 1 : ð62Þ
Eliminate m
PAðAÞ ¼ 1M þ 1þ
M
M þ 1 P ðAÞ: ð63Þ
3 This probabilistic interpretation is principally due to Professor Young [38].
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Hence
cA ¼
PAðAÞ
PðAÞ ¼
1þMP ðAÞ
ðM þ 1ÞPðAÞ and 1 cA ¼
P ðAÞ  1
ðM þ 1ÞP ðAÞ : ð64Þ
Substitute in (61)
PAðBÞ ¼ P ðAÞ  1ðM þ 1ÞP ðAÞ þ
1þMPðAÞ
ðM þ 1ÞP ðAÞ ¼
P ðA \ BÞ þMPðAÞP ðBÞ
ðM þ 1ÞP ðAÞ
¼ M
M þ 1 P ðBÞ þ
1
M þ 1 P ðB jAÞ; ð65Þ
where we have used (58). In eﬀect, the parameters in Deﬁnition 14 are
aA ¼ MM þ 1 ¼
1 PAðAÞ
1 PðAÞ ; bA ¼
1
M þ 1 ¼
PAðAÞ  P ðAÞ
1 P ðAÞ ; ð66Þ
where (62) has been used to solve for M . In summary, the update of the
probability of B conditional to the event A becomes
PAðBÞ ¼ 1 PAðAÞ
1 P ðAÞ P ðBÞ þ
PAðAÞ  P ðAÞ
1 PðAÞ P ðB jAÞ: ð67Þ
Now compare with (46) and note the following correspondence:
P ðAÞ $ BelðAÞ ¼ PlðAÞ; PAðAÞ $ BelAðAÞ ¼ PlAðAÞ: ð68Þ
This is the probabilistic interpretation of the most ﬂexible IAE-based
updating strategy we were seeking.
5. Example
To illustrate the proposed notions, consider a decision node that receives
sensor data generated by magnetometers distributed throughout a battleﬁeld.
From the sensor readings it has received so far, suppose the node models its
knowledge about the object located at a particular battleﬁeld location via a
BBA with the FoD H ¼ fmetal; non-metal; emptyg. Consider the belief, plau-
sibility and BBA corresponding to a particular battleﬁeld location given in
Table 3.
Suppose the node then receives a new piece of evidence that the location is
indeed occupied by an object (metal or non-metal). To update the BBA above,
we utilize the conditioning proposition A ¼ fmetal; non-metalg ) A ¼
femptyg. The updates corresponding to the strategy in Deﬁnition 14 appear in
Table 4.
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Compare with the results in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 4.1:
(1) Both {empty} and {non-metal, empty} properly intersect with A. Hence
their conditional BBAs are zero; accordingly, their updated BBAs depends
only on their corresponding original BBAs.
(2) Note that {metal} 2TðAÞ. Hence its conditional BBA does not get reﬁned
except for the re-normalization by PlðAÞ ¼ 0:9; its updated BBA follows
accordingly.
(3) S({non-metal})¼S({metal, non-metal})¼ {non-metal, empty}. This is a
focal element that is being annulled by conditioning. Hence neither of
the propositions {non-metal} or {metal, non-metal} belong in TðAÞ and
therefore their conditional BBAs get reﬁned.
Next, let us consider the role faA; bAg play in the updating mechanism. The
BBAs corresponding to various strategies, together with the corresponding
uncertainty intervals, are indicated in Table 5.
Note that, for the most ﬂexible IAE-based strategy, aA ¼ 1PlðAÞ1BelðAÞ ¼ 10:910:8 ¼
0:5. In sensor information processing situations, the reliability of the incoming
evidence plays a crucial role in determining when and how to update the
current knowledge base. It is clear how easily faA; bAg can accommodate this
requirement
Table 3
Example 1––originally cast evidence
B BelðBÞ PlðBÞ mðBÞ
metal 0.7 0.7 0.7
non-metal 0.1 0.2 0.1
empty 0.1 0.2 0.1
{non-metal, empty} 0.3 0.3 0.1
{metal, non-metal} 0.8 0.9 0
Table 4
Example 1––updated evidence. Note that, aA þ bA ¼ 1
B BelAðBÞ PlAðBÞ mAðBÞ
metal 0.7aA þ 0:7
0:9
bA 0.7aA þ
0:7
0:8
bA 0.7aA þ
0:7
0:9
bA
non-metal 0.1aA þ 0:1
0:8
bA 0.2aA þ
0:2
0:9
bA 0.1aA þ
0:1
0:8
bA
empty 0.1aA 0.2aA 0.1aA
{non-metal, empty} 0.3aA þ 0:1
0:8
bA 0.3aA þ
0:2
0:9
bA 0.1aA
{metal, non-metal} 0.8aA þ bA 0.9aA þ bA
0:07
0:72
bA
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(1) The II-based strategy assumes the incoming evidence to be completely false
and keeps its previous evidence intact.
(2) The ZI-based strategy assumes the incoming evidence to be completely
reliable. The corresponding IE-based updating strategy sacriﬁces the in-
tegrity of the available evidence in assigning complete certainty to the
proposition {metal, non-metal}, viz., incoming information that mentions
the presence of an object is accepted as fact.
(3) The IAE-based strategy, on the other hand, attempts to strike a balance be-
tween these two extreme cases. It accepts the incoming evidence to the ex-
tent that the integrity of the previous evidence is not compromised. So, the
belief in the proposition fmetal; non-metalg is made not to exceed its previ-
ously assigned plausibility.
6. Conclusion and future research directions
The reliability of the information being gathered and the integrity and in-
ertia of the currently available knowledge base play crucial roles in making
complex subjective decisions. This is especially true in distributed sensor net-
works operating in, for example, battleﬁeld environments. In this paper, we
utilize the conditional belief and plausibility notions applicable within the DS
evidential reasoning framework to arrive at an evidence updating strategy to
address these concerns.
First, the DS conditional notions in [27] are viewed with respect to how they
impact the originally cast BBA. This viewpoint we believe is more useful since
it enables one to provide a more intuitive assessment of how the conditioning
proposition aﬀects the remaining propositions. Indeed, one is now able to in-
terpret conditioning as an annulment of the masses of all those propositions
that do not definitely imply the conditioning proposition. Of these, only the
masses of the propositions that may imply the conditioning proposition are re-
distributed to those propositions that do definitely imply the conditioning
proposition. A characterization of these latter propositions that may beneﬁt’
from a proposition whose mass is being annulled is also provided.
Table 5
Example 1––BBA s and uncertainty intervals corresponding to various updating strategies
Proposition B II-based aA ¼ 1 ZI-based aA ¼ 0 Most ﬂexible IAE-
based aA ¼ 0:5
metal 0.700 [0.700,0.700] 0.778 [0.778,0.875] 0.739 [0.739,0.787]
non-metal 0.100 [0.100,0.200] 0.125 [0.125,0.222] 0.113 [0.113,0.211]
empty 0.100 [0.100,0.200] 0.000 [0.000,0.000] 0.050 [0.050,0.100]
{non-metal, empty} 0.100 [0.300,0.300] 0.000 [0.125,0.222] 0.050 [0.213,0.261]
{metal, non-metal} 0.000 [0.800,0.900] 0.097 [1.000,1.000] 0.048 [0.900,0.950]
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This BBA based interpretation shows that conditioning may be viewed as a
way to restrict one’s viewpoint to those propositions that are in common’ with
the conditioning proposition. In other words, conditioning enhances support
only for those propositions that definitely imply the incoming evidence while
nullifying the support for all remaining propositions. It is this intuitively very
appealing viewpoint that forms the basis on which the updating strategy in
Section 4 has been developed. It linearly combines the available evidence with
the incoming evidence conditioned to the conditioning proposition thus en-
suring that masses of propositions that may imply the complement of the
conditioning proposition are decreased while the masses of propositions that
definitely imply the conditioning proposition are increased. We believe this to
be a very sensible strategy.
In addition to this property, the proposed updating strategy also enables one
to account for the reliability of incoming evidence, integrity and inertia of
existing evidence and its ﬂexibility to incoming evidence. The appeal of the
proposed updating strategy lies in its ability to address these issues with ease
via appropriate selection of the pair of linear combination weights which es-
sentially weighs’ the incoming conditional evidence against what is already
available. Of particular importance is the development of a strategy to ensure
that the integrity of existing evidence is not compromised. Its corresponding
probabilistic interpretation we believe is quite novel and provides justiﬁcation
for its application.
Updating an existing knowledge base with evidence generated from diﬀerent
FoDs is not addressed in this work. Decision making in the presence of partial
evidence generated from such non-exhaustive FoDs is a key issue encountered
in several application areas. Despite its success in situations when some in-
formation essential for a probabilistic approach is unavailable and as a model
for subjective human reasoning under uncertainty and representing ignorance
[39], the fact that DRC in Deﬁnition 6 requires evidence to be generated from
sources possessing identical FoDs has been one of its major drawbacks [40–43].
Approaches to circumvent this diﬃculty include the following:
• Ignoring differences in FoDs. In this basic approach, the evidence is assumed
to discern the same frame H. See Fig. 4. The implication of such an assump-
tion is that all decision processes are assumed to have access to all the infor-
mation sources. In other words, it ignores the fact that each decision process
may not have access to all the sources, and hence this approach cannot be
considered an eﬀective methodology. Actually, the counter-intuitive conclu-
sions the DRC may produce under such an assumption are well documented
and highlight a major drawback in the existing DS theory [44].
• Deconditioning approach. In this approach proposed in [25,44], the closed-
world assumption made in [2] is relaxed. Consequently, the knowledge for-
malized in the FoD now becomes incomplete because some propositions are
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not considered. The strategy used to handle this situation assumes the exis-
tence of other sources of information that discern the missing propositions,
and these sources are expected to provide the missing information. See Fig.
5. In other words, in the deconditioning approach, one supposes that the
missing propositions and the propositions of the existing information
sources are considered together by these other sources. Sources with ade-
quate variety’ in terms of propositions they consider and performance in
terms of discernment of these propositions are therefore essential.
We believe that the updating strategy proposed in this paper exposes per-
haps a new conditional approach for combining evidence when one encounters
non-exhaustive FoDs. The premise of this approach is that combination of
Fig. 5. Deconditioning approach.
Fig. 4. Approach of ignoring diﬀerences in FoDs.
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evidence from two FoDs makes sense only when one restricts the viewpoint to
those propositions belonging to their common intersection. Thus, instead of
assuming extra’ knowledge when combining non-exhaustive FoDs, one simply
extracts relevant information from the smallest common sub-FoD which is
then combined. This we feel provides a better representation of the uncertainty
associated with the missing propositions. The envisioned approach is to ﬁrst
focus on those propositions belonging to the common intersection and then
account for the remaining propositions. See Fig. 6.
The newly developed BBA based interpretation indicates that conditioning
can be used to isolate’ knowledge that is common to the frames; the individual
evidence cast by each frame then need to be incorporated to capture the
knowledge from the remaining propositions. This is essentially what a strategy
composed of a linear combination of the conditional and the available evidence
does––conditioning term is an indication of the propositions that are common
to available evidence and incoming evidence while the other term captures the
remaining propositions. Hence, we believe an appropriate generalization of the
proposed updating strategy may enable both these tasks to be performed
within an integrated environment.
We believe that this conditional approach, at least in certain applications,
may in fact oﬀer the better option. As an example, consider a wireless ad hoc
sensor network [45] where the very limited energy reserves of nodes require
each node to act as a relay of sensor information from other nodes while
Fig. 6. Conditional approach.
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generating and transmitting its own information. Can a node eavesdrop’ into
the information of other nodes it is relaying and update its own knowledge
base? The conditional approach can facilitate such a reﬁnement since it enables
the node to simply concentrate on the propositions that are in common to its
own frame without the need for its expansion’. This type of strategy would be
extremely useful for, for instance, a mobile sensor which may now move and
station itself at a better location to observe a particular object of interest.
Some preliminary results along the above mentioned ideas have been recently
presented in [46]. Several research issues however are still under investigation.
For example, an issue of critical importance that is yet to be addressed is related
to the non-commutativity of the conditional [27], and hence the updating
strategy. In certain applications this might in fact be desirable. For example,
consider a knowledge base, such as a database ofMRI images, constructed from
a vast amount of evidence gathered over several years. With the arrival of a new
piece of evidence, one clearly would not want to ignore the inertia of the existing
database. These are issues that need careful consideration.
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